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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
·wAYNE C. LUNDEBERG and
JOYCE R. LUNDEBERG, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.
WALTER K. DASTRUP and
MRS. WALTER K. DASTRUP,
his wife,
Defendants, Counter Claimants
and Cross-Claimants,
ALYCE H. HUSBANDS,
Cross-Defendant and CrossClaimant, Respondent .
.JOHN L. REEDER and
MRS. J-OHN REEDER,
Cross-Defendants.

Case No. 12625

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT ALYCE H. HUSBANDS.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND THE
ISSUE INVOLVED

In the mam the respondent, Alyce H. Husbands,
with the opening statement set forth in appellants'
hrief, immf ar aR the statement confines itself to the fac-
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tual situation only and not to any legal conclusions that
the appellants draw therefrom.
All that is involved in this appeal is whether or not
the plaintiffs Lundeberg _are entitled to subject the
premises described in the pleadings to execution and sale
under the provisions and language of the decree made
and entered in February of the year 1964, which awards
plaintiffs

Lundeberg

an

attorney's

fee

of $500.00

against the defendants only.
At the outset of this brief, respondent Husbands haR
no quarrel with the law as argued and presented in the
appellants' brief, and which is stated on page 9 thereof,
as follows:

''It is well settled that an execution purchaser ac-

quires such estate or interest and only such estate
and interest as the execution debtor had, taking
merely a quit-claim of the execution debtor's title."
This legal pro bl em is not involved in the instant

situation. The respondent Husbands has never and does
not presently claim an interest in the property greater
than the interest of plaintiffs Lundeberg.
Appellants set up a straw man and then proceed to
knock it down. They assume and direct their entire argument to the lee;al proposition that the award of attorneys
fees to the plaintiffs was an award against Alyce Hns-

,
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bands, counter-claimant and cross claimant but whose
rights in the property involved the. cross-defendants
Hee<ler only, and who were dealing solely with Husbands.
They assume that the decree aiwarded an attorney's fee
as against and to be charged to a cross-defendant who
was not in any way contesting the rights of the plaintiffs Lundeberg to an execution and writ of restitution,
rather than against Dastrups who were in possession and
against whom Lundebergs commenced the suit for restitution of premises. The decree does not award an attorne:'i'S fee against Husbands. (Tr. 61)
Under the terms of the decree Husbands was awarded the right to foreclose her interest as against the Dastrups, and which interest was later foreclosed by sheriff's
sale in 1964 (Tr. 62) ; and at which sale Husbands
became the purchaser; and thereafter she and her vendee
in possession have kept up all payments due the plaintiff,. Lrmdeherg-.
After a period of approximately seven years since
the cDtrv of the decree in this cause, plaintiffs' counsel
l'aused an execution to issue out of the District Court of
Tron County, and jnsi8ted that the sheriff proceed there11nder to advertise and sell the premi&es. The sheriff
rrfnsed so to do,
advised that the premises had
lwrn sold under a previous sale to Husbands; that the
rflflrmption perio'1 had long- since expired and that the
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premises were not, therefore, subject to further sale.
After a hearing thereon, at ·which time no one appeared
in opposition, the court ordered the sheriff to proceed
with the sale. Upon a later hearing, and after a full consideration of the problem, the court rescinded its former
order, concluding that the decree did not award an attorneys fee as against Husbands and her interest in the
premises, and that the award of attorneys fees did not
constitute a lien against Husbands interest. The sole
question is now posed -

"was there an award of $500.00

as against Alyce C. Husbands and her interest in thr
property, and did the award as set np i1' the decree constitute a lien against Husband's interest?" The lowrr
court decided against plaintiff 'R contention and vacated
its former order.

ARGUMENT
As stated in apnellants' brief "thP proposition is
that plaintiff brought an action for unlawful
detainer to retain possession of the property because of
the failure of persons in possession to pay under the real
estate contract.'' (Bottom of page 6 and top of page 7
of appellant's printed vrief). The persons in possession
were defendants Dastrups. These defendants brought
Husbands into the case as a cross-defendant and crosscomplainant. At no point in the controversy was there
any dispute or contention about Hus hands' interest, and
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at no point did Husbands take a position adverse to the
Lundebergs; and at no point in the litigation was Husbands' interest adverse to that of the plaintiffs Lundeberg. As pointed out in appellant's brief, the court granted to plaintiffs an execution and Writ of Restitution with
the further sum of $500.00 attorneys fees; but this award
of $500.00 was not awarded as against cross-defendant
Husbands.
It is significant that when the plaintiffs Lundeberg

filed their plaintiffs' brief in the original litigation (the
brief being a part of the files in this cause (Tr. 36 at page
5 thereof) it was stated on the last page of the memo,
as

follows:
''Plaintiffs should like to point out in conclusion
that there is no conflict or dispute with the crossdefendant Alyce Husbands **** She as a holder in
the chain of interests has been unable to receive her
pa:vments along with plaintiffs and she has been
n•nuired to stand by and watch defendants operate
this bnsinPss witli pavments tn no one. We submit,
plaintiffs arP entitled to jmmediatP nossession of the
nremises, sub.iPct to the interest of the crnss-ddendfonrlrmf Alyce 0. Husbands."

The real issue in the case was between Lundebergs
and D[l_strup, with Husbands brought in as an innocent
and who took no issue with the plaintiffs.
Tlli1strative of this fact is the following- directive contnined in thP trial court's memorandum decision on page

7 of said decision dated October 9th, 1963, (Tr. 40 at
page 7 there,of) as follows:
''Counsel for plaintiffs and cross-defendant Mrs.
Husbands will prepare appropriate judgment for
the court's execution, restoring to the plaintiffs
immediate possession of the premises and foreclosing Mrs. Husbands vendors lien. In addition please
provide for attorneys' fees in favor of the plaintiffs'
and cross-defendants' counsel in the amount of
$500.00 each and for their costs of court, as against
the defendants."
It is obvious from the above the c9urt intended that
as against the plaintiffs and the defendants (Dastrup)

both. plaintiffs and cross-defendants were awarded attorneys fees ; and if the court intended and if the decree
intended that plaintiffs Lundeberg were to have an
award of attorneys fees as against both the defendant
and the cross-defendant, the court's memorandum and
the decree would have spelled this out with no ambiguity
whatsoever.
Respondent asserts there is no provision in the decree (Tr. 50) to the effect that the attorneys fee awarded
to plaintiffs Lundeberg constituted a lien upon Husbands
interest in the property, or that the fees should be chargeable to Husbands.
It would impose an undue burden upon this court

to reiterate the entire position of Husbands as set forth
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in her memorandum of authorities (found at page Transscript 79, pages 1 to 8 inclusive) and Husbands reply to

plaintiff's memorandum (f oimd at pages 80-81 of the
transcript) ; and it is respectfully suggested that a reading of Husbands memorandum as fully set forth in the
transcript, including her memorandum of authorities and
reply to plaintiff's memorandum, (Tr. 79-80), will be
helpful in a determination of the problem being urged by
appellant.
It is significant that no claim has been asserted by

the plaintiffs Lundeberg or its counsel for attorneys fees
as against cross-defendant Husbands, from the date of
the decree in February, 1964, until seven years later,
'''hen on the 9th day of April, 1971, attorney for plaintiffs
serYed a notice upon Nick Garavelli, then in possession
of the property, that plaintiff's attorney was claiming
the sum of $786.00 as attorneys fee. (Tr. 63-64).
Respondent urges that the judgment for attorneys
freR in favor of Lundebergs only, as distinguished from
cross-defendant Husbands, does not impose a lien upon
the property. and particularly not upon Husbands interest therein .
.As shovYn by the above notice, (Tr. 63-64), Nick
raravelli, was in the peaceable possession of the premi"{IR
thP operator of the Motel, (this under a purchase
thrrrof from Husbands).
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It is submjtted that an examination of the title concerning the property would not show any lien against
the premises in favor of the Lunde bergs or their attorney, and particularly after a lapse of seven years a purchaser was not under notice that such a lien would be
claimed. On the contrary, the record did show that Husbands purchased the premises under an order of sale
issued out of the· Court in the year 1964.

Sec. 58-51-41 U.C.A. 1953, provides that an attorney
has a lien upon his client's cause of action which attaches to a verdict, report, decision or judgment in his
client's favor and the proceeds thereof in whosoever
hands they may come. This would presumably give him
a right of action against the proceeds of the sale of the
property in the hands of the sheriff, (the sale under the

judgment, and not a subsequent sale), but certainly does
not give him a separate lien apart from the judgment, as
he is not a judgment creditor and his right of action, of
course, is against his client as a result of the sheriff's
sale held on April 24, 1964. Now, seven years later, ap's interest
. pellant is claiming a first lien against
in the property, and asking the court to require, by court
order, a second sale of the property held by a third person.
If Attorney Duncan intended to claim a lien on the
property with the right to collect an attorney's fee there-

under, it was incumbent upon him to take some action
within a reasonable period to assert such claim. The
language as set forth in the case of of Lundy vs. Cappuc-

cio 54 Utah 420, 181 Pac. 165, is applicable in this case
at bar. A discussion of this case, and its applicability to
the case now before this Court will be found in respondent's brief to the trial court, (Tr. 79, pages 7 and 8
thereof) and it would unduly burden this record to reiterate what is said in such memorandum.
CONCLUSION

Respondent Husbands concludes this brief with the
assertion that there is no legal or equitable principle
nnder which the plaintiffs or their counsel are now entitled to assert a lien against the premises and/or to have
the premises again subject to a sheriff's sale. Mrs. Husbands is not making any claim that the sale of the property to her wiped out the right of plaintiff's counsel to
collect his fee from his clients, but she does contend that
the decree does not and did not impose upon her a requirement that she was responsible for the payment of
the fee, or that her interest in the property was charged
with such payment.
Respectfully submitted
CLINE, ,JACKSON

&

JACKSON

Attorneys for Respondent Husbands.

